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ABSTRACT
Recent full-scale crash tests of the weak-post W-beam guardrail system have resulted in
unsatisfactory collision performance as evaluated by the National Cooperative Highway
Research Program (NCHRP) Report 350. Since acceptable crash test performance is
required in order to use a guardrail on a Federal-Aid Highway in the United States, the
poor performance of the weak-post W-beam guardrail is a significant problem to those
states that use it. The goal of this project was to improve the impact performance of the
weak-post W-beam guardrail system so that it satisfies the requirements of NCHRP
Report 350 at test level three.
iii
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11 INTRODUCTION
Full-scale crash tests have demonstrated that the performance of the weak-post W-beam
guardrail system do not meet current safety standards that are required for use on
Federally funded highways.(3) (11) The reason for the poor performance of the system
has been attributed to the post-rail connections, splice failure, inadequate anchorage of
the system and the mounting height of the W-beam on the posts.
The guardrail posts in the weak-post W-beam system are only intended to hold the W-
beam in position until a vehicle impacts it. Guardrails should be mounted high enough to
ensure that the first rail-vehicle contact happens at the bumper and fender of the vehicle.
During impact the W-beam rail should release from the posts and remain in contact with
the impacting vehicle until the vehicle has been redirected away from the system. In
some cases, however, the W-beam does not separate from the posts and is pulled to the
ground during impact, which allows the vehicle to override the guardrail and penetrate
behind the system. In other cases the failure of the system has been the result of the W-
beam rupturing at a splice location where the individual sections of W-beam are joined
together.
As shown in figure 1, the current weak-post W-beam guardrail system (G2-system) is
connected to the post with an 8-mm diameter bolt and a square washer under the bolt
head. The bolt is tightened with a nut that clamps the post, rail and washer together. The
rail is 2.67 mm thick and its center is mounted 610 mm above the ground. An additional
214-mm diameter bolt with nut is located below the rail to support the rail under snow
loading. The posts are spaced 3810 mm apart. The splice connections between each rail
section consist of eight 16-mm diameter bolts and the splices are located at every post.
The 8-mm diameter post-rail connection bolt is supposed to fail at an early stage of an
impact to prevent the rail from being pulled down with the post and effectively reducing
the height of the guardrail.(2)
New guidelines for full-scale crash testing of highway longitudinal barriers were issued
by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in 1993.(11) These new crash test
requirements, as specified in the National Cooperative Highway Research Program
(NCHRP) Report 350, now include 2000-kg pickup trucks and 700-kg subcompact cars
to accommodate a greater range of vehicles. Effective May 16, 1994, all newly developed
barrier systems had to meet the requirements of NCHRP Report 350 before they could be
installed on federally funded highways, whereas, existing barrier systems that had
previously passed NCHRP Report 230 were temporarily exempt from this new testing
requirement. Effective October 1, 1998, however, all new installations of barriers
(including all existing and newly developed systems) that are to be used on federally
funded highways must satisfy the requirements of NCHRP Report 350.
3NCHRP Report 350 specifies two required tests for evaluation of longitudinal barriers to
test level three:
· NCHRP Report 350 test designation 3-10: An 820-kg passenger car impacting the
Length of Need (LON) of the longitudinal barrier at the Critical Impact Point (CIP) at
a speed of 100 km/h and an angel of 20 degrees.(12)
· NCHRP Report 350 test designation 3-11: A 2000-kg pickup truck impacting the
LON of the longitudinal barrier at the CIP at a speed of 100 km/h and an angle of 25
degrees.(12)
The safety evaluation of a barrier according to NCHRP Report 350 is performed on the
basis of three factors. Structural Adequacy, Occupant Risk and Vehicle Trajectory.(12)
The weak-post W-beam guardrail system performed acceptably in previous full-scale
crash tests at test level 2 but failed to meet test level 3 conditions.(3) (11) The barrier
passed test designation 3-10 but failed test designation 3-11.(2) Sometimes the vehicle
penetrated the barrier and sometimes the vehicle overrode the barrier. The G2-system
mainly failed the test because it did not meet the Report 350 Structural Adequacy
evaluation criterion which states that the “test article should contain and redirect the
vehicle; the vehicle should not penetrate, underride, or override the installation although
controlled lateral deflection of the test article is acceptable.”(12)
4The major goal of this project was to improve the impact performance of the weak-post
W-beam guardrail system so that it satisfies the requirements of NCHRP Report 350 at
test level three. Since the weak-post W-beam system already meet test designation 3-10
the task of this project was to improve the current weak-post W-beam system so that it
meets the requirements of test designation 3-11.
Specific issues related to the performance of the weak-post W-beam system were:
· Prevent guardrail ruptures at the splice connection,
· Developing a more reliable post-rail connection detail,
· Reducing the chance of rupturing the guardrail and
· Preventing the vehicle from vaulting over the guardrail.
This goal was pursued using a variety of techniques including structural design,
laboratory experiments, finite element analyses and full-scale crash tests.
A secondary goal was to develop a finite element model of the splice connection. This
model was used investigating the performance of the splice. The knowledge derived from
modeling the splice can be used in a broader aspect when modeling bolted connections.
5Figure 1: Weak-post W-beam guardrail system. (7)
62 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Ray and McGinnis describe the history, geographical distribution, geometry and
performance of the G2-system.(2) The weak-post W-beam guardrail system shown in
figure 1 is used in the eastern part of the United States in particular. New York,
Pennsylvania and Connecticut use this system. Weak-wood post W-beam guardrails were
once common in mid-western states like Ohio and Minnesota and they are still used in
Ontario, Canada. Systems similar to the weak-post W-beam guardrail are used in the
United Kingdom and other European countries.
The AASHTO-AGC-ARTBA Highway Barrier Hardware Guide includes drawings of the
G2-system (designated SGR02a in the Hardware Guide as shown in figure 1), the 2-space
W-beam guardrail and material specifications for guardrail steel.(7)
Ross, Sicking and Zimmer present recommended procedures for safety evaluation of
highway features in the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP)
Report 350.(12) The authors specify impact conditions and evaluation criteria for full-
scale crash tests of longitudinal barriers. Two different tests are required for a barrier to
pass in order to meet test level 3 conditions. Test designation 3-10 conditions involves an
820-kg passenger car impacting the Length of Need (LON) at the Critical Impact Point
(CIP) at a speed of 100 km/h and an angle of 20 degrees. Test designation 3-11
7conditions involves a 2000-kg pickup truck impacting the LON at 100 km/h and an angle
of 25 degrees.
2.2 Full-scale crash tests
Results from full-scale crash tests with the weak-post W-beam system and other systems
essential for this research are presented in this section of the literature review. The tests
are divided in two different groups dependent of the nature of the particular failure. The
first group contains crash tests where the barrier failed to meet the test requirements
cause the vehicle overrode the barrier and the second group contains crash tests where the
barrier failed to meet the requirements cause the vehicle penetrated the barrier.
Vehicle override failures
Bronstad and Burket describe five full-scale crash tests performed in 1968 for the Ohio
Department of Highways with a timber weak-post W-beam system.(1) This system used
timber posts instead of steel and the purpose of these tests was to determine if the system
met the then-current crash test requirements. Post size, notching of existing strong timber
posts and post-to-rail attachment were the variables. The W-beam guardrail used in the
timber weak-post system was the same as used in the steel weak-post system. The post-
rail connection in test ODH-1 was composed of a 7.94-mm diameter bolt with front and
rear washers and a nut behind the post. The vehicle, a full-size 2000-kg four-door sedan,
impacted the system at a speed of 110 km/h and an impact angle of 25 degrees. The
connection was supposed to fail due to shearing the bolt but the bolt and rear washer were
8instead pulled through the post material. The authors conclude that: “Although the
vehicle was redirected, loss of rail height and lack of sufficient post strength allowed it to
straddle the rail. This contributed to multiple rollover… Rail separation from the posts,
which occurred only at the posts in the immediate impact area, was due to forcing the
bolt and rear washer through the post material.”(1)
One reason for the poor behavior of the system was that the guardrail was not released
from the posts quickly enough but followed the posts to the ground allowing the vehicle
to straddle the guardrail. Pulling the bolt and washer through the post material required
more time and displacement than shearing the bolt. The problem with the post-rail
connection was solved using a steel insert pipe in the wooden material and a thinner 6.35-
mm diameter bolt instead of the former 7.94-mm diameter bolt. The steel insert pipe was
inserted to “provide a shearing surface similar to that provided by the steel flange of the
G2 standard post.”(1) This way the bolt was sheared off instead off pulled through.
Despite these improvements, the timber weak-post guardrail post-rail connection was
found unreliable in the field and quickly became obsolete.(2) This system has now almost
totally disappeared from highways in the U.S.
9Mak and Alberson present a full-scale crash test (TTI 7147-21) with a G2-system
performed in 1993 by Texas Transportation Institute.(3) This test was performed at
NCHRP Report 350 test level three conditions (i.e., a 2000-kg pickup truck impacting the
guardrail system at the impact speed of 100 km/h and 25 degrees). The purpose of the test
was to determine if the G2-system had the ability to contain and redirect a 2000-kg
pickup truck at test level 3 conditions. The authors stated that: “ The left front, left rear
and right front tires of the vehicle overrode the guardrail and exited only when the end of
the guardrail installation was reached. It is evident from reviewing the high-speed video
that, had there been a longer run of guardrail, the vehicle would likely have vaulted over
the guardrail completely… The impact performance of the G2 guardrail system was
therefore considered unsatisfactory….”(3)
What is happening here is that the vehicle straddled the guardrail as can be seen in figure
2 to 5. The authors explain that “as the vehicle was being redirected, the W-beam rail
element dropped and began to dig into the ground at 0.732 second. At 0.768 second, the
left front tire began to mount the guardrail and was on top of the rail by 0.895 second.”(3)
The maximum deflection before failure was 2.4 m. The pictures of the collision show that
the rail starts to drop just a little bit, which at this large deflection is enough to let the rail
come in contact with the front right wheel and the vehicle starts to climb the rail.
10
Vehicle penetration failures
Kilareski, El-Gindy, St. John and Peacheux report the results of three full-scale crash
tests with the G2-system performed in 1998 by Pennsylvania Transportation Institute.(11)
These tests were at NCHRP Report 350 test level three conditions (i.e., a 2000-kg pickup
truck, 100 km/h, 25 degrees) and the objective was to determine if the weak-post W-
beam guardrail system meet the Report 350 level three requirements. The first two tests
did not conform to test level three since the impact speed was much lower than the
Figure 2: Cash sequence at time » 0.3
sec (TTI 7147-21).
Figure 3: Cash sequence at time » 0.5
sec (TTI 7147-21).
Figure 4: Cash sequence at time » 0.6
sec (TTI 7147-21).
Figure 5: Cash sequence at time » 0.8 sec
(TTI 7147-21).
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required 100 km/h. The third test, however, did conform to test level three conditions.
The test vehicle impacted the system between post 5 and 6. The rail ruptured at the splice
at post 7 and the vehicle penetrated the barrier. The authors conclude that: ”The system
performance, however, was poor with a rail splice rupture occurring at the splice on post
#7. The rupture occurred approximately 0.228 s after impact and occurred when the right
front corner of the test vehicle was between post 8 and 9.”(11) The maximum deflection
was 1.5 m just before panel rupture.
Ross, Bligh and Menges report the results of a full-scale crash-test (TTI 472480-7) with a
modified strong-steel post W-beam system (G4(1S)-system) performed by Texas
Transportation Institute.(15) The system was modified with routed wood blockouts
instead of the standard W150X12.6 steel blockouts. The test was performed with a 4X4
2300-kg Pickup Truck at the impact speed of 110 km/h and the impact angle was 20
degrees. This was not a standard NCHRP Report 350 test. The vehicle impacted the
installation 0.7 m upstream of post 17.  The rail ruptured at the splice at post 19. The
authors describe the impact scenario as:  “At 0.104 s, the left front tire snagged on post
18, and at 0.106 s, post 20 moved. The left front tire separated from the vehicle at 0.126
s, and at 0.154 s, the vehicle reached post 19. By 0.158 s, post 21 moved, and by 0.176 s,
the rail tore from the top of the rail in a downward direction at post 19… At 0.213 s, the
rail separated from post 19 and the vehicle was travelling at 86.6 km/h at an angle of 5.9
degrees. At 0.216, the rail ruptured.”(15) The maximum dynamic deflection before the
12
rail tore was 0.68 m. The vehicle climbed the rail but remained upright during and after
the collision.
Buth, Zimmer and Menges present a full-scale crash test (TTI 405421-2) with a modified
G4(1S)-system.(16) Stronger W150X17.9 steel block-outs were used instead of the
standard W150X12.6. The test was performed at NCHRP Report 350 test designation 3-
11 conditions. The vehicle impacted the installation 672 mm upstream of post 17. The
authors describe the impact scenario as: “The vehicle began to redirect at 0.065s, the left
front tire contacted post 18 at 0.087 s, and the tire began to turn toward the guardrail. By
0.192 s, the W-beam rail element ruptured near the splice at post 19 as the vehicle was at
a 14.30 degree angle to the rail. The maximum deflection of the rail element before
rupture occurred was 1.00 m.”(16) The vehicle penetrated the barrier and rolled over
behind the guardrail. The failed guardrail element is shown in figure 6. A “strength
analysis (ASTM A370) were performed on three specimens taken from the torn rail
segment near the tear. Yield strength was 436 Mpa, tensile strength 514 MPa, and the
percent elongation in 51-mm gauge length was 25 percent.”(16) The rail tension was
obtained at three locations, between post 15 and 16, between post 18 and 19 and between
post 22 and 23, from strain gauge bridges. The tension in the rail between post 18 and 19
was about 130 KN when the splice failure occurred. Worth mentioning is that the post-
rail connection bolt tension was measured at post 17 and 18 and the splice displacement
was measured at post 15, 19 and 23. The splice displacement was measured with splice
13
displacement transducers. The splice displacement at post 19 was about 50 mm at
maximum and 35 mm when the splice failure occurred.
Mak, Bligh and Menges report the results of four full-scale crash tests conducted with
four different vehicles, a Ford Taurus, Chevrolet Lumina, Plymoth Neon and a Dodge
Caravan.(17) A modified G4(1S)-system was used in these tests. The installation was
modified with timber blockouts instead of the standard W150X12.6 steel blockouts. The
crash test with the Chevrolet Lumina (TTI 472580-2) resulted in a splice failure at post
15. The 1500-kg vehicle impacted the rail 0.84 m upstream of post 14 with an impact
speed of 98.4 km/h and an impact angle of 25.0 degrees and contacted post 14 at 0.041
sec. This was not a standard NCHRP test. The authors explain that “the vehicle began to
redirect at 0.043 s and post 16 moved at 0.080 s.  At 0.112 s, a tear appeared at the lower
Figure 6: Ruptured rail element at splice in TTI Test 405421-2. (16)
14
edge of the W-beam rail at post 15 and, at 0.115 s, the vehicle contacted post 15…. The
W-beam rail element ruptured at 0.122 s.”(17) The vehicle penetrated the guardrail and
ended up on its roof behind the guardrail installation.
Research was performed in order to determine the cause of the splice failure. Fifteen
laboratory tests were conducted using coupons cut from the ruptured rail element to
determine if the material met the AASHTO M180 specifications (i.e. 482 MPa in tensile
strength). The results in Table 1 show that the tensile strength was just above the
specifications in all cases but one. The zink coated rail coupons of the W-beam material
tested in the independent laboratory was just below the specification. The authors
concluded “there are significant differences in terms of tensile strength and percent
elongation between the Trinity Laboratory testing results and the mill certificate. When
compared to the testing results from the independent testing laboratory, the differences
are even more striking. There are no apparent reason for such discrepancies and the
differences are too large to be random variation.”(17)
Average Yield
Strength (MPa)
Average Tensile
Strength (MPa)
%Elongation
Independent Laboratory
· Zinc coated rail 416 476 25
· Non zinc coated rail 415 486 23
Trinity Industries 453 572 23
Mill Certificate 445 529 31
Table 1: Laboratory test results for AASHTO M180 guardrail steel.(17)
The authors also stated that: ”it is believed that the properties of the rail element did not
materially contribute to the rail rupture.”(17)
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The investigators continued with the effort to determine what caused the splice failure by
looking at the test data. They claimed that: “The rail element was not subjected to
excessive deflection or general pocketing at the splice. The upstream anchor was barely
disturbed, indicating that there was not excessive tensile load on the rail prior to
rupture… However, it is clear from the two high-speed cameras located behind the rail
that, shortly after impact, a hard point on the vehicle (apparently the frame horn) began to
flatten the lower corrugation of the rail and continued with the flattening as the vehicle
proceeded down the guardrail. A localized pocket was formed at the splice post, which
led to a tear on the lower edge of the rail element and the eventual rupture of the
rail.”(17) They also conclude that “it is unclear why or how that happened, or if this is
unique or repeatable, or what can be done to alleviate this problem.”(17)
Mak, Bligh and Menges report the results of three crash tests conducted on the MELT-2
terminal.(18) In one of the crash tests (TTI 405541-4) performed at NCHRP Report 350
test designation 3-34, which involves an 820-kg passenger car impacting the CIP at a
speed of 100 km/h and an angle of 15 degrees, the W-beam ruptured at a splice. The
vehicle impacted the MELT-2 terminal at post 2. The vehicle began to redirect at 0.035 s.
The right corner of the vehicle reached post 3 at 0.074 s. The authors explain that “at
0.091 s, the rail element began to tear at the lower bolt hole of the splice at post 3. The
maximum dynamic deflection of the rail element just prior to the tear was 0.53 m.  The
rail element began to deform around post 4 at 0.116 s and then buckled at post 4 at 0.121
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s.  By 0.122 s, the rail element was completely ruptured at the post 3 splice.”(18) The
vehicle penetrated the rail.
Mak and Menges report the results of four full-scale crash tests performed with a Mini-
MELT terminal for use with the G2-system.(19) The purpose of this crash test was to
evaluate the adequacy and strength of the transition from the weak-post W-beam system
to the strong-post Mini-Melt terminal. The second test (TTI 471470-23) was performed at
NCHRP Report 230 Test Designation S31 conditions (2000-kg passenger car, impact
speed 100 km/h and impact angle 25 degrees). The vehicle impacted the guardrail
terminal 4.6 m upstream of the last wooden post of the terminal (post 5). The numbering
in this test was different from the standard. The upstream end-post of the terminal was
numbered 12 and the second post from the upstream end was numbered 11 and so forth.
The vehicle contacted post 3 at 0.055 s, post 4 at 0.147 s and “at 0.148 s after impact, the
W-beam rail element ruptured at the splice at post 5 (last wood post of the terminal
section).“(19) The maximum dynamic deflection before rupture was 0.3 m. The ruptured
W-beam element is shown in figure 7.
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Figure 7: Ruptured rail element at splice in TTI Test 471470-23. (19)
The major conclusion from these full-scale crash tests is that the weak-post W-beam
guardrail system does not meet the NCHRP Report 350 test level three criteria. The G2-
system cannot contain and redirect an impacting 2000-kg pickup truck in a safe and
stable way as required by NCHRP Report 350 test designation 3-11. Sometimes the
guardrail ruptures and the vehicle penetrates the barrier and sometimes the guardrail
drops and the vehicle overrides the barrier.(3) (11) A review of videos of prior full-scale
crash tests showed that one cause of the guardrail dropping and allowing the vehicle to
override the barrier was the inconsistent failure of the post-rail connection. An
investigation of the post-rail connection is performed in this research.
Another conclusion is that barriers occasionally rupture at the splices in full-scale crash
tests with other barrier systems than the G2-system. Splice failures have been observed in
tests with the strong-post W-beam system, the MELT Terminal and the Mini-MELT
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Terminal. (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) Essentially all W-beam barriers use the same type of
eight-bolt splice connection to connect the W-beam sections and all such systems
experience splice failures occasionally. An investigation was performed in this research
to explore the performance of the splice in detail and to suggest modifications to
guardrail systems that uses this connection that would prevent the rail from rupturing at
the splice.
2.3 Finite element modeling
Finite element analysis is a good tool to simulate impacts. Laboratory tests and crash tests
are often time consuming and expensive to carry out. It is therefore often useful to
perform a simulated test before performing a physical test. This way weak spots in a
structure can be identified at an early stage of the developing process, which saves money
and time. The finite element program LS-DYNA is an “explicit three dimensional finite
element code for analyzing the large deformation dynamic response of inelastic solids
and structures” and was used for the simulations in this project.(8) LS-DYNA has been
used with good results in crash-test simulations for years.
Plaxico, Patzner and Ray describe techniques they used in developing a finite element
model of the guardrail post-soil interaction.(4) The interaction was modeled using springs
between post and soil below grade. The model was compared with a pendulum test of a
strong-post and the simulated results corresponded well to test data. These modeling
techniques were used in the research described in this report.
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Wright and Ray describe techniques for modeling steel materials in LS-DYNA for
guardrail materials.(5) Quasi static laboratory tension tests were performed on AASHTO
M-180 guardrail steel coupons and compared with finite element solutions of the same
test. LS-DYNA material parameters were optimized to achieve the best correlation
between laboratory tests and FE-tests. Two different LS-DYNA material models were
used for modeling guardrail steel, the kinematic/isotropic elastic-plastic material model
(Type 3) and the rate-dependent tabular isotropic elastic-plastic material model (Type
24).(5) There were two different sets of properties for material model Type 3, one bi-
linear set covering elongations up to 11 percent and one elastic-perfectly plastic set
covering elongations from 11 percent up to failure, which happens at about 25 percent
elongation. Both sets of properties are accurate as long as they are used in the appropriate
range of elongations. The authors came to the conclusion that  “material Types 3 and 24
are not adequate for modeling strain rate effects for AASHTO M-180 guardrail” and they
did therefore not include strain-rate effects in the models.(5)
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3 PERFORMANCE OF GUARDRAIL SPLICES
3.1 Introduction
Weak-post W-beam guardrail sections are connected to each other with eight 16-mm
diameters bolts and nuts. The splices are located at every post in the G2-system (figure
1). One problem that has been observed in the field and in full-scale crash tests with the
G2-system is that the W-beam sometimes ruptures at the splice allowing the vehicle to
penetrate the barrier.(11)
This problem is not unique to the weak-post W-beam system. Occasionally the guardrail
ruptures at the splice in strong-post W-beam systems, guardrail terminals and guardrail-
bridge rail transitions.(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) The design of the splice connection is the
same in all these systems although the location of the connections in each system varies.
The objectives of this chapter are to determine why guardrails occasionally rupture at the
splice and to suggest modifications that might prevent the rail from rupturing. A
combination of laboratory tests and finite element simulations were used to explore the
performance of splices in the weak-post W-beam system. A secondary goal of this
chapter was to develop and evaluate a finite element model of the splice connection. This
model was used for the finite element simulations described in this chapter and the
knowledge from this task can also be used in a more general manner when modeling
bolted connections.
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First, a series of uniaxial tensile laboratory tests were performed to explore the response
of the splice connection due to uniaxial loading and to collect data for evaluation of a
finite element model of the connection. The model of the splice was used to explore the
performance of the connection when subjected to a more realistic loading case in a
simulation. The results from this simulation were used to derive a theory to explain why
guardrails sometimes rupture at the splices. The theory was compared with the results
from prior full-scale crash tests and an improved design that solves the problem was
recommended.
3.2 Laboratory uniaxial tensile tests
A series of quasi-static laboratory uniaxial tensile tests of the guardrail splice connection
were performed using a Tinius-Olsen 1780-kN (400,000-lbs) load test machine. The
purpose of the uniaxial tensile test was to examine the uniaxial failure mechanism and
ultimate strength of the splice and to collect data for validation of a finite element model
of the splice connection.
Special grips to hold the ends of the guardrail when pulling the splice apart were
designed and fabricated. These had to be able to withstand larger loads than the bolted
splice connection and the rail cross-section. Each grip consisted of three steel
hemispherical bars welded to a plate that was designed to fit in the grips of the load
tester. Twenty-one 12.7-mm diameter A307 bolts were used to clamp the rail to each grip
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fixture. Long plate washers were used between nuts and rail to increase the friction.
Figures 8 and 9 show the test setup and the grips.
Three uniaxial tensile tests were performed with this setup. The first test was interrupted
since the bolts used for the grips failed at around 390 kN. Weaker, 9.5-mm diameter bolts
and small round washers were used to clamp the rail to the grips in the original design.
The grips were improved by using stronger 12.7-mm diameter bolts and long plate
washers between nuts and rail. The same test was continued and completed successfully.
Two more tests were then performed successfully. The failure mechanism and maximum
pulling force were considered consistent through out the tests.
Figure 8: Uniaxial tensile test setup.
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When the splice was loaded axially, the splice bolts rotated and bent the edges of the
splice holes (figure 10). The sharp edge of the bolt head and nut tore the material around
the holes on both layers of guardrail (figure 11). Finally, the bolts started to tear through
the guardrail material around the holes and were pulled through the holes allowing the
splice to be pulled apart completely. At the end of all three tests one of the outer splice
bolts tore the guardrail material completely. The results from the physical uniaxial
tension tests are summarized in Table 2.  The splice failed at approximately the same
displacement and force in all three tests. The curves up to failure differed somewhat,
though (see figure 12), because the connection is sensitive to how the two layers of W-
Figure 9: Test grips.
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beam are lined up relative to each other.  The splice holes are actually slots and the force
direction response will be affected by where in the slot the bolt is positioned.
The highest tension measured in the rail upstream of the impact point in a full-scale crash
test of a weak-post guardrail system is usually below 300 kN.(9) What is happening at
400 kN in a uniaxial laboratory test is, therefore, probably not what happens in a real
impact. The test is not very realistic but the force-displacement curves for the last two
tests are valuable when evaluating the finite element model of the connection.
Figure 10: Failed splice connection.
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Test Failure Mechanism Max. Pulling
Force (kN)
Displacement at max
force (mm)
991222_01* Splice bolts pulled through
splice holes
438 NA
000117_01 Splice bolts pulled through
splice holes
408 22.86
000322_01 Splice bolts pulled through
splice holes
409 24.13
*Interrupted and continued after redesigning the test fixture. Displacement data lost
when test interrupted.
Table 2: Uniaxial tension test results for a guardrail splice.
Figure 11: Guardrail damage caused by bolt-head and nut tearing material.
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It is difficult to perform a realistic laboratory test that replicates the loading on the splice
connection in a full-scale crash test since the loading and deformations are very complex.
Instead, a finite element model of the splice was developed and evaluated. The model
was later implemented in a sub-model consisting of a weak-post and the rail section at the
study post with the splice connection in the middle. Using the sub-model, the
performance of the splice connection in a full-scale crash test could be simulated and
studied in detail.
The next section in this report describes the modeling and evaluation of a finite element
model of the splice connection.
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Figure 12: Uniaxial tension test force-displacement graphs.
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3.3 Finite element model of the splice connection
Truegrid version 1.4.0 was used to generate the geometry and mesh of the finite element
model of the splice and to apply boundary conditions.(20) Springs, dampers, material
models and load curves were also implemented using this software.
An important feature of the mesh was that it should be easy to change. For example,
making the mesh finer in particular areas of interests should be easy to do. This was
accomplished using parameters for the number of nodes between indices in the mesh.
This way, changing the value of a certain parameter changes the whole mesh in a
predetermined and time effective manner. Another important feature of the model was
the use of different material model definitions for each individual part. This feature made
it possible to examine a particular part of the model, for instance a splice hole, using a
post processor without being disturbed by other parts hiding the view. It also gives the
opportunity to treat every part individually regarding material designation.
The shape of the W-beam was modeled with 51 nodes through the cross section to
produce a smooth and accurate mesh. The coordinates for each node in the cross-section
were collected from a drawing of the W-beam in the AASHTO-AGC-ARTBA Highway
Barrier Hardware Guide.(7) The two W-beam guardrail sections, connected by the splice,
were modeled as two different parts. Figure 13 shows the right-hand part. The geometry
of the left-hand section is the same as the geometry of the right-hand section but
mirrored. The rectangular holes in the rail shown in figure 13 make room for splice and
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postholes, which were modeled as separate more finely modeled parts. It was essential to
model the splice holes with a fine mesh since the distribution of stresses and strains
around the holes were of interest in this investigation. A mesh that is too fine, though, is
computationally expensive and makes the model impractical to use. A number of
different meshes were generated and tested in simulated tests. The final and finest of the
meshes is shown in figure 14. This is the mesh that was chosen for the splice model. The
shape and positions of the splice holes were collected from the AASHTO-AGC-ARTBA
Highway Barrier Hardware Guide.(7) The geometry of the splice bolts and splice nuts
were collected from the same Hardware Guide. The accuracy of the splice bolt and nut
geometry was important since it affects how hard the rail sections can be clamped
together. Figures 15 and 16 show these components. Figures 17 and 18 show the
complete assembled splice model, front-view and back-view.
The laboratory tensile test described earlier in this chapter was now simulated using the
finite element model. The purpose of this simulation was to evaluate the performance of
the model by comparing the simulation test results with physical test results.
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Figure 13: The right W-beam guardrail section.
Figure 14: Model of the splice hole.
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Figure 15: Model of the splice bolt.
Figure 16: Model of the splice nut.
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Figure 17: Front-view of assembled guardrail splice model.
Figure 18: Back-view of assembled guardrail splice model.
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3.4 Simulated uniaxial tensile test
LS-DYNA version 950c was used for the finite element simulations in this chapter.(8)
The uniaxial tensile test was simulated using finite element analysis in order to evaluate
the FE-model by comparing the physical test results with the simulation results.
Boundary and load conditions
Boundary and load conditions in the simulation should correspond to the physical test
setup. The ends of the rail, where the grips were located in the physical test, were fixed in
all directions but the axial direction. The axial load was applied at the ends of the rail
with a nodal velocity boundary condition card.(8) To be able to compare the results from
the simulation with the results from the laboratory tests, a cross-section definition for
force output was implemented through the cross section of the rail quite near the rail end.
The force output gives the total cross-section force as function of time and was easily re-
plotted as force verses displacement (figure 20). Clamping the rail sections together
really tight with the eight splice bolts and nuts was an important aspect of the model. The
splice nuts should be clamped up against the shoulders of the bolts and then stay there
throughout the tensile test. This was achieved by attaching springs and dampers between
the nuts and the ends of the bolts. When the nuts had been fully pushed up against the
shoulders of the bolts with the help of the springs they were merged together with the
bolts preventing them from moving further (figure 19).
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Material and element properties
Wright and Ray developed two different LS-DYNA material models for guardrail steel,
the kinematic/isotropic elastic-plastic material model (Type 3) and the rate-dependent
tabular isotropic elastic-plastic material model (Type 24).(5) There were two different
sets of parameter values for material Type 3, one bi-linear model valid for elongations up
to 11 percent and one perfectly plastic model valid for elongations from 11 percent up to
25 percent. The advantage of the Type 24 model is that it is valid for all elongations.
Both the Type 24 model and the Type 3 model were tested. The perfectly plastic material
parameter values were used for the Type 3 model since the material was loaded until or
near failure. LS-DYNA rigid material model Type 20 was used for the splice nuts and
bolts.
Figure 19: Nut pushed against the
shoulder of the bolt.
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No strain rate effects were considered. No failure condition was included in the model.
The failure mechanism in LS-DYNA material model 24 uses the effective plastic strain
as failure condition. When the effective plastic strain reaches a certain value the element
stress is put to zero effectively removing the element from the model. This failure
mechanism is mesh sensitive and a specific value of the maximum effective plastic strain
has to be set for each mesh. Two different LS-DYNA 3D-shell elements were tested for
the rail, the 4-node Hughes-Liu element and the simpler more computationally cost-
effective 4-node Belytschko-Tsay element. Three and five integration points through the
shell thickness were tested.
Simplicity worked better for this very hard-to-model loading case. There were a lot of
edge-loaded shell elements in the simulation around the splice holes where the bolts were
pressed up against the edges of the holes. Shell elements are not good in handling such
load conditions. An alternative solution, from using shell elements, could be to use solid
elements but that would make the computation time unreasonable high and the model
would be unpractical to use. Instead all efforts were put on optimizing the performance of
the model using shell elements. There were no apparent differences in the performance of
the Hughes-Liu element and the Belytschko-Tsay element in this analysis. The
Belytschko-Tsay element was chosen since it is less computationally demanding than the
Hughes-Liu element. LS-DYNA material Type 24 is more computationally demanding
than Type 3 and in general also more accurate for the entire elongation response. Simpler
material models like Type 3 often causes less numerical and contact problems than more
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sophisticated models and using them can be a good way to avoid these problems. For this
simulation material Type 3 was more stable than Type 24. The axial loading of the splice
causes a lot of edge loaded shell elements, which the simpler material model Type 3
handled better than Type 24. In other loading cases of the splice with not as high axial
load but more bending the Type 24 model would probably perform better. Three
integration points through the thickness of the shell element worked better than five
points for this analysis. All material and element data is listed in Table 3.
Material Type 3 Material Type 24
Density (Mg/mm3) 7.86e-9 7.86e-9
Young’s Modulus (MPa) 200e+3 200e+3
Poisson’s Ratio 0.33 0.33
Yield Stress (MPa) 528.0 415.0
Tangent Modulus 300.0 -
Hardening parameter Kinematic Isotropic
Strain rate effects None None
Failure condition None None
Increments of strain - 0. 0.02 0.08, 0.165 0.33 0.495 0.66 1.0
Increments of stress
(MPa)
- 415 415 548 585 591 595 600 605.
Element type Belytschko-Tsay Belytschko-Tsay
No. of Integration points 3 3
Table 3: Material and element data for AASHTO M-180 Class A Type II guardrail steel.(5)
Contact definitions and friction
The LS-DYNA soft constraint formulation contact definition was used for all contacts in
this model in order to avoid instability problems which may occur when using the penalty
factor formulation. A lot of re-meshing had to be performed before the analysis was free
from shooting nodes and other contact problems. The Young’s modulus of the rigid bolts
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was decreased by a factor of twenty in order to make the contact between the shell edges
of the splice holes and the shanks of the splice bolts softer. This change did not affect the
results of the simulation other than reducing numerical problems that resulted in shooting
nodes and exploding meshes. The discrete nodes impacting surface (LS-DYNA contact
definition Type 5a) was used between splice bolts and holes and between splice nuts and
holes. Automatic single surface contact (Type 13) was used between splice holes and
guardrail. The static and dynamic friction between all parts was set to 0.15 respectively
0.09 with a decay coefficient of 0.266*(10)-3.(14) The contact definitions were set to see
shell thickness.
Figure 20 shows the resulting response of the simulated axial tensile test (labeled
“Material 3”) in comparison to the physical tests.
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3.5 Simulation characteristics
The cross-section force (mean nominal force) in the W-beam increases quickly as the
splice is pulled apart and the splice holes are pushed against the bolt shanks (curve
labeled “Material 3” in figure 20). Stress concentrations build up around the splice holes
(figures 21 and 22). The heads of the bolts and nuts start to cut into the material around
the splice holes as the bolts rotate resulting in high stress concentrations (figures 23 and
24). Figure 26 shows stress concentration factors for a few nodes located around a splice
hole as function of time and figure 25 shows the locations. This factor decreases with the
distance from the edge of the hole. The time and displacement when the maximum stress
occurs in a particular element also increases with the distance from the hole. The
response off the material surrounding the splice holes is a continous process through out
the splice pulling. First the elements nearest the splice hole reaches its maximum axial
stress and bend. Then the second row of elements and so on. Figure 27 shows how the
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Figure 20: Force-displacement curves for uniaxial tension tests of splice
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axial stress and bending moment changes through out the simulation for three different
elements. The elements 34362, 34357 and 34353 correspond to the nodes 35864, 35690
respectively 35574 in figure 8. The first row of elements (element 34362 in this case)
starts out with a high axial stress and bending moment forcing the element up against the
bolt shank when yield stress is reached. Both the axial stress and the bending moment
levels of and basically the element become in-plane loaded. The same procedure is
repeated for the second row and so forth until no more material can be compressed up
against the bolt shank. Then the material starts to fold around and under the bolt head
which element number 34357 is an example of. Both the axial stress and the bending
moments increases as the material around the hole is pushed against the bolt until the
element finally reaches yield stress and the axial load drops. The bending moment
continues to increase causing the folding behavior. The material surrounding the splice
hole switches deformation modes from axial to a pure moment. Element number 34352 is
located quite a distance from the hole and never reaches yield. Both bending moment and
axial stress continue to increase through the run even though the moment changes sign
after a while.
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 Figure 21: Von Mises stress (front-view) in the uniaxial splice pull simulation.
Figure 22: Von Mises stress (back-view) in the uniaxial splice pull simulation.
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Figure 23: Rotating bolt in the uniaxial splice pull simulation.
Figure 24: Guardrail material deformations in the uniaxial splice pull simulation.
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Figure 25: Stress concentration (undeformed view) in
the uniaxial splice pull simulation.
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Figure 26: Stress concentration factors around splice holes.
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Figure 27: Axial Von Mises stresses and bending moments.
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3.6 Evaluation of finite element model of the splice
Three uniaxial tensile laboratory tests of the splice connection were performed and a
finite element model of the splice was developed. The uniaxial tensile test was then
simulated in a finite element analysis using the splice model. The resulting force-
displacement curves for two of the physical tests and also the simulated test (labeled
Material 3) are shown in figure 20. Comparing physical and simulated test results is a
good way to evaluate the performance of a model. This section describes such a
comparison for the splice model.
The maximum load (failure load) in the physical test was approximately 400 kN and in
the simulation 350 kN. The displacement at maximum load was 24 mm in the physical
test and 26 mm in the simulation. No failure mechanism was implemented in the finite
element model but the load leveled off at the same displacement in the simulation as it
did in the physical test indicating the point of failure. There were differences between the
slopes of the two physical load curves and also that the simulated load curve followed a
more leveled path than the physical tests. The differences in slope of the two physical
force-displacement responses indicate that the simulated force-displacement curve may
fit within a broad envelope of load curves if a lot of physical tests had been performed. A
reason for the differences between the two physical test responses could be that the splice
connection is sensitive to how the two layers of W-beam are lined up relative to each
other.
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The simulated curve follows the laboratory curves reasonable well up to approximately
125 kN where the slope of the curve decreases considerably. The bolts in the simulation
start to rotate at this point creating stress concentrations where the head of the bolt and
edge of the nut cut into the material around the hole. This can be seen as local high
stresses in the simulation and torn material in laboratory tests (compare figures 11 and
24).
The differences between the simulation test results and the physical test results were
explained by poor performance of the shell elements when edge loaded. Shell elements
are weak when loaded axially and bend too easy. When the element cannot take more
axial load it bends down. The splice bolts start to rotate as the material around the splice
hole bend against the bolt shank and the stress-displacement curve drops, which was what
happened at 125 kN.
 A new analysis was performed in order to verify this theory.  An artificial way to
increase the axial strength of the shell elements located closest to the bolt shank is to
increase the friction between bolts and splice holes. This makes it harder for the edge of
the hole to bend against and slip down the bolt shank. Both the static and the dynamic
friction coefficient were set to 5.0 and the analysis was performed again. The higher
friction coefficients were added very locally between bolts and splice holes. The load-
displacement curve labeled “Material 3, Friction Coeff = 5” in figure 20 shows that the
simulated force-displacement curve becomes more similar to the laboratory test curves by
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adding friction essentially confirming the theory. The simulation curve corresponded well
with physical test results up to 200 kN when higher friction coefficients were used.
Other solutions were tried in order to stiffen up the elements. It was, for instance,
discovered that the material had thickened considerable around the holes in the physical
tests, which complicate the rotations of the bolts. This could be one reason why the splice
is stiffer in the laboratory than the simulated test is. It showed up to be very hard to
implement shell thickening in the model. There was not enough time to examine this
phenomenon in more detail in the scope of this research.
The model is considered to perform well enough to use for further research concerning
the splice connection since the basic behavior of the model agrees with physical tests and
maximum displacement and stress values correspond to physical test results. The axial
tensile test is considered as “worst case” due to the incidence of high axial loaded shell
elements. The model is assumed to work better for other cases with a more diverse
loading. The stresses in the full-scale crash-tests usually stays between 100 to 150 kN and
the simulation results agrees pretty well with laboratory test results in this area.
A finite element sub-model was developed to explore how the splice performs in a full-
scale crash situation. This model consisted of a G2 weak-post and the W-beam with the
splice connection at the post. The model was subjected to loads collected from the rail
section at a particular post in full-scale crash simulation.
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3.7 Sub-model of  post and W-beam with splice
The sub-model shown in figure 28 consists of a G2 weak-post and the W-beam with the
splice connection at the post.  In order to investigate the performance of the splice in a
full-scale crash situation, load conditions were collected from the system in the region of
a particular post in a full-scale crash simulation and applied to the guardrail ends in this
sub-model. This way, the full-scale crash test could be simulated just studying the
particular post and the performance of the splice could be examined in detail. The vehicle
in the full-scale crash simulation impacted the G2 installation mid-span between post 6
and 7. Post 8 was the study post (figure 58). It would be unreasonable to model the splice
connection in detail in a full-scale model due to the computational time requirements. In
order to decrease the analysis time further the loads were applied five times faster in the
sub-model than they appeared in the full-scale simulation. The W-beam was attached to
the post with a spot weld that was set to fail at a tensile load of 20 kN corresponding to
the failure load of the 7.94 mm diameter A307 bolt used in a standard G2 post-rail
connection.
The details of the full-scale simulation from which the loads were collected, and the
details of how these loads were applied to this sub-model, as well as the material
properties and post-ground connection are discussed in detail in chapter 5.2 and 5.3. The
properties of this model will not be discussed further in this section.
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The rail displaced longitudinally upstream relative to the study post due to large lateral
deflections in the impact event (figures 29 and 30). The post was twisted as it bent back
Figure 28: Sub-model of post and splice.
Figure 29: Front-view of sub-model. Figure 30: Front-view of deformed sub-model.
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allowing the sharp edge of the twisted post to come in contact with the back layer of W-
beam. When the post-rail connection failed the W-beam started to slide up against the
post flange and, eventually, should have been pulled over the top of the post. Due to
contact problems the analysis was terminated before this could happen. Though, the
simulation was carried out far enough to draw conclusions about why guardrails
occasionally fail at the splice. As shown in figures 31 and 32 there was a high stress
concentration at time 34 msec. through the cross-section of the back layer of W-beam.
This stress concentration passed through the right column of splice bolts. The stresses in
the front layer of W-beam were much smaller than in the back layer and were of no
significance regarding tearing. The high stresses were released by flattening out the W-
beam at the stress concentration as is shown in figure 33. A plastic hinge was developed
at the cross-section through the four right splice bolts and the W-beam was somewhat
folded around the post at this location. The plastic hinge is clearly visible in figure 34
which shows the effective plastic strain in the back layer of the guardrail at time 42 msec.
The sharp edge of the post flange contacted the back layer of W-beam at the lower edge
of the rail were the effective plastic strain was really high as shown in figure 34. A tear
would probably be initiated at this point in a crash test. A plastic hinge always follows a
path through the highest stresses and strains as it propagates through material. Based on
that fact, the most probable path for a tear to propagate through the cross-section of the
back layer of W-beam was predicted and drawn in figure 34. The tear is most likely to
follow a path close to, or through, the right four splice holes.
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Figure 31: Von Mises stress contour plot at time 34 msec.
Figure 32: Von Mises stress contour plot at time 34 msec. showing back layer of guardrail.
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Figure 33: Von Mises stress contour plot at time 39 msec. showing back layer of guardrail.
Figure 34: Effective Plastic Strain plot at time 42 msec. showing back layer of guardrail.
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In order to confirm the splice failure theory derived from the finite element simulation the
literature sources in the literature review concerning splice failures in full-scale crash
tests were studied in detail. If the failures in the physical crash tests correspond to the
suggested crack path in figure 34, then the theory will be confirmed.
3.8 Characteristics of splice failures
This section is a summation of the six full-scale crash tests in the literature review where
the guardrail system failed to meet test requirements due to splice failure. The
characteristics of these tests are summarized in Table 4. Most reports are sparse with data
regarding splice failures, probably because it is unexpected when it happens. There is
only one reference in this compilation of crash tests where the splice failed in a G2-
system. Splice failures are, though, more general and occurs in all W-beam barrier
systems that use the same splice connection as the G2-system. The design of the splice is
the same in the G4-system and the MELT terminal and the characteristics of the splice
failures observed in full-scale crash tests are similar for all systems with this connection.
The first conclusion from these splice failures was that the tear always passed through at
least one splice hole and often through all four of the splice holes in the cross-section of
the W-beam. Now remained to determine if the tear occurred at the same column of
splice holes in the physical tests as predicted in the simulation and if the tear followed
approximately the same path as predicted. In the simulation a tear would occur in the
back layer of W-beam at the downstream column of splice holes and follow the path
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drawn in figure 34. The tear would probably be initiated at the lower edge of the W-
beam. The figures and impact descriptions of the crash tests in the test reports were
studied and it was determined whether the splice failure in a particular test corresponded
to the prediction derived from the FE-simulation or not. Four out of the six splice failures
corresponded well to the prediction. It was not possible to tell from the information
presented in the reports of the two remaining tests whether the failure happened as
predicted or not although the tear passed through all four of the splice holes in the cross-
section of the W-beam in both these tests indicating that the rail probably ruptured as
predicted in these tests also.
Figures 35 and 36 shows a typical splice failure. These figures are from a test where a
1500-kg Chevrolet Lumina impacted a G4-system between post 13 and 14.(17)  The
authors describe the rail rupture as follows: “At 0.112 s, a tear appeared at the lower edge
of the W-beam rail at post 15… The W-beam rail element ruptured at 0.122 s.”(17)
Figure 36 shows the location of the study post where the rail tore and also the posts
between which the vehicle impacted the system. Figure 35 shows a close-up view of the
ruptured rail element. The back layer of W-beam at post 15 tore at the downstream
column of splice holes. The tear was initiated at the lower edge of the W-beam and
followed a path through all four splice holes. The failure corresponded to the prediction.
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Figure 37: Ruptured rail element in TTI test 405541-4.(18)
Figure 37 shows the ruptured
rail element in TTI test 405541-
4.(18) The back layer of W-
beam tore at the downstream
column of splice bolts as
predicted from the FE-
simulation. The tear was
initiated at the lower post hole
and followed a path very similar
to figure 34.
Figure 35: Close-up view on
ruptured rail.(17)
Figure 36: Location of splice failure and interesting posts.(17)
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Figures of the torn rail elements from the crash tests described in reference 16 and 19 are
shown in the literature review.
Reference
11 15 16 17 18 19
Barrier Type G2 G4 G4 G4 MELT MELT
Test conditions A B A C D E
Max lateral deflection (m) 1.5 0.68 1.0 - 0.53 0.3
Rail tension at failure (kN) - - 130 - - -
Splice holes with cracks 4 4 1 4 1 4
Splice displacement at failure (m) - - 0.035 - - -
Failure similar to FE-simulation Not
known
Yes Yes Yes Yes Not
known
Table 4: Characteristics of full-scale crash-test splice failures.
A. NCHRP Report 350 level 3-11: 2000-kg pickup, 100 km/h, 25 degrees.
B. Non Standard Test: 4X4 2300-kg pickup Truck, 110 km/h, 20 degrees.
C. Non Standard Test: 1500-kg passenger car, 100 km/h, 25 degrees.
D. NCHRP Report 350 level 3-34: 820-kg passenger car, 100 km/h, 15 degrees.
E. NCHRP Report 230 level  S31: 2000-kg passenger car, 100 km/h, 25 degrees.
3.9 Conclusions
Since the splice failures observed in full-scale crash tests corresponded with the tearing
theory derived from the finite element simulation, the theory was considered proven to be
correct. The guardrail occasionally ruptures at the splice since a plastic hinge is
developed at the downstream column of splice holes where the rail is bent around the
post. The sharp edges of the splice bolts and splice nuts or the sharp edge of the post
flange initiates a tear at the stress and effective plastic strain concentration. The tear
propagates through the cross-section of the W-beam following the path marked in figure
34. The problem is the splice bending around the post. The most straightforward way to
solve this problem is to move the splice to the mid-span between posts where it will be
loaded more in tension than bending.
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4 POST-RAIL CONNECTION
4.1 Introduction
Prior full-scale crash tests of the weak post W-beam guardrail have resulted in failures
where the vehicle either overrode the guardrail or penetrated it.(3) (11) Reviewing of
high-speed videos of prior tests revealed that one source of this poor performance was the
post-rail connection detail. This section describes laboratory tests and full-scale crash
tests done in the developing process of an improved post-rail connection.
The post-rail connection is supposed to fail in the early stages of the crash so that the
guardrail is released from the post instead of being pulled down with the post. When the
rail detaches early in the impact event it will remain in contact with the fender of the
vehicle and be more effective in redirecting the vehicle. If the connection fails too late,
the rail will be pulled to the ground along with the post and this may result in the vehicle
vaulting over the barrier.
The weak-post W-beam guardrail system is a flexible traffic barrier. While redirecting an
impacting vehicle, large lateral deflections are expected. The guardrail redirects the
vehicle by transforming lateral forces into longitudinal tensile forces in the guardrail. The
lateral deflection forces the posts to bend to the ground or break. The rail has to separate
from the post at an early stage to prevent pulling the rail down with the post. If the rail
height is decreased too much, the vehicle may override the barrier or the wheel may snag
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the post. The desired performance of the post-rail connection is to fail at a low load level
early in the impact event.
The separation mechanism for the current connection is for the bolt to fail and thereby
release the guardrail from the post. Full-scale crash tests have shown, however, that
current post-bolt connection behavior is inconsistent and unrepeatable. The objective of
this section of the report was to design a connection with a more consistent and reliable
failure mechanism.
Laboratory tests were performed on the existing post-rail connection to determine its
characteristics and performance. From these results two new alternative connections were
developed and tested. The most promising of the alternatives was then implemented in a
complete G2-system and tested in a full-scale crash test.
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Test Failure Strength (kN)
1 27.3
2 27.0
3 26.1
4 22.4
5 15.4
6 19.9
     Table 5: Tensile strength of  7.94-mm
diameter A307 galvanized bolts.
4.2 Existing Connection
The current connection consists of:
· Two layers of guardrail (e.g., the post-rail connection is at a splice),
· One  7.94-mm (5/16-in) diameter A307A bolt,
· One 2.67 mm thick (12-gauge) square washer between the bolt head and the guardrail
and
· One nut.
Several quasi-static load tests were performed
on the existing connection. First, a series of
tests was performed to determine the axial
tensile capacity of the bolts themselves.
According to the AISC Manual Of Steel
Construction, the minimum tensile strength of
a 7.94-mm diameter A307A bolt is 20 kN.(6)
In Table 5, the bolts used for test one to three
came from the PTI crash-tests and the bolts
that were used for test four to six came from a PennDOT maintain garage. All the PTI
bolts were above the minimum failure strength but that was not the case with the bolts
obtained from the district maintain garage, which were sometimes weaker than the
specification.
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The loading experienced by the bolt during an impact is not necessarily a pure axial load.
In order to explore the performance of the connection under a variety of more realistic
loading cases, the connection was subjected to several quasi-static load tests. The tests
were performed with a Tinius-Olsen 1780-kN (400,000-lbs) load test machine.
Two different support setups were used: (1) the guardrail mounted at a 30 degree slope
about the rail axis (figure 38) and (2) the guardrail mounted at both 30 degrees from the
guardrail axis and 15 degrees from the post axis (figure 39). These orientations were
selected to represent the loading experienced by the connection as the post is bent back
and twisted during an impact. The post bolt was positioned in two different positions of
the guardrail slot, centered or at the edge. The ends of the rail section were anchored to
the test machine base and the test machine grips were used to pull on the web of the post.
This resulted in the loading being applied to the bolt in a manner similar to what would
be experienced in a full-scale crash test but quasi-static instead of dynamic. The loading
was applied at a rate of 89,000 N/minute.
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  Figure 39: Test setup for 30/15 degrees load test.
 Figure 38: Test setup for the 30/0 degree load test.
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Test Orientation Ultimate Force (kN) Failure Type
99072001 30/0   edge 19.4 Washer pulled through slot
99072002 30/0   edge 19.9 Washer pulled through slot
99100601 30/0   centered 27.0 Washer pulled through slot
99072701 30/15 edge 22.5 Nut stripped threads
99073001 30/15 edge 17.7 Nut stripped threads
99080201 30/15 edge 18.5 Washer pulled through slot
Table 6: Summary of test results for existing connection.
The laboratory test results with the two different setups are presented in Table 6. The
results showed that the connection behavior is inconsistent and has some undesirable
features. In some cases the washer was pulled through the slot of the guardrail as shown
in figure 40. In other cases the nut stripped the bolt threads as shown in figure 41. The
load required to cause the connection to fail was sometimes as high as 27 kN. Although
the load required to pull the washer through the guardrail slot, in most cases, was about
the same as that required to fail the bolt, pulling the washer through the slot takes a lot of
time and displacement. In a full-scale crash-test, this long duration failure may result in
the rail being pulled with the post to the ground.
Similarly, the nut is stripped off the bolt in a series of jerks that require both time and
displacement. This might result in a long duration failure where the rail is pulled down
61
with the post. Figure 44 shows the force-displacement curve for a series of jerks in a later
performed test where the nut stripped the threads.
The desired performance of this connection is for the bolt to fail at a low force level and
for the failure to happen quickly. The failure mechanism also needs to be consistent and
not sensitive to the direction of loading. The existing connection exhibits several different
failure mechanisms (e.g., nut stripping threads, pulling the washer through the slot and
bolt failure). The loads that cause failure are variable and the displacement that causes
failure is relatively large. For these reasons, the existing connection is not considered to
result in good impact performance.
Figure 40: Result of test 99072001 and
99072002 showing the failed
components.
Figure 41: Result of test 99073001
showing the failed
components.
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4.3 Improved Connection
Some new alternatives were developed and tested in order to achieve a more consistent
connection failure mechanism. Two new alternatives were tested.
The first design consisted of:
· One layer of guardrail (e.g., connection to post is not at a splice),
· One 7.94-mm diameter A307A bolt,
· Two 2.67 mm thick square washers between the bolt head and the guardrail and
· One nut tightened one full turn past snug.
In this design there is only one layer of guardrail because the splice connection has been
shifted to the mid-span away from the posts. The reason for this is to prevent the splice
from bending around the post. Excessive bending of the splice together with high tension
in the rail could induce tearing and rupturing of the guardrail as described in chapter 3.
Two washers are used instead of one in order to prevent the washers from being pulled
through the guardrail slot.
A new series of quasi-static tests were performed to determine the performance of this
new connection. As shown in Table 7, the nuts stripped off the bolt threads in the two
tests. The force required to strip the nut off varied considerably between tests and was
unacceptably high for the second test (test 99100701). In addition to the high force in the
second test, the nut was stripped off the bolt in a series of jerks that required an additional
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3 mm of displacement to fail the connection (figures 42 and 43). The force that was
required to strip the nut off was considerably lower in the first test (test 99100602).
Instead the jerking behavior was more prominent and an additional 14 mm of
displacement was required to fail the connection because of the series of jerks (figure 44).
The extensive amount of time, displacement and load required to strip the nut off the
threads could result in the rail being pulled to the ground in a full-scale test so this
alternative was not considered acceptable.
Test Orientation Ultimate Force (kN) Failure Type
99100602 30/0 centered 18.7 Nut stripped threads
99100701 30/0 centered 32.9 Nut stripped threads
Table 7: Summary of test results for design alternative 1.
Figure 43: Force-displacement graph for test 99100701.Figure 42: The result of test
99100701showing the
failed components.
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Since the performance of the connection was not sufficiently improved, no further tests
were performed on this design alternative. A second alternative connection was designed
to prevent the nut from stripping threads and concentrate the failure in the bolt.
The second alternative consisted of:
· One layer of guardrail (e.g., the connection is not at a splice),
· One 6.35-mm (1/4-in) diameter A307A bolt,
· Two 2.67 mm thick square washers between the bolt head and the guardrail,
· Two nuts tightened one full turn past snug and
· One circular washer between the nuts and the post.
A weaker bolt than the former one is used in order to obtain an early failure of the bolt at
a lower load level. Two nuts are used to prevent the nut from stripping the bolt threads
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Figure 44: Force verses “jerk”-displacement graph for test 99100602.
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and to force the failure to occur in the threads of the bolt. The circular washer was used
because the standard hole in the weak-post are sized for the 7.94-mm diameter bolts and
are therefore a little large for the 6.35-mm diameter bolt.  If the post were manufactured
with smaller holes more appropriate for the 6.35-mm diameter bolt the circular washer
could be eliminated.
The connection was tested at two orientations and with the connection positioned in two
places in the slot. In the first several tests the connection was centered in the slot whereas
in the third test the bolt was pushed to the edge of the slot to determine if the edge
reinforced the connection resulting in a higher failure load. As shown in Table 8, the
second design alternative resulted in a consistent failure of the bolt at a load of about 16
kN. The connection always failed by fracturing the bolt through the threads and the
connection was not sensitive to the position of the bolt in the slot or the orientation of
loading. In fact, the ultimate load decreased somewhat as the loading became more
complicated. The double washers showed no sign of bending or pulling through the
guardrail slot. The performance of design alternative two was considered acceptable and
an improvement over the original design. Figures 45 and 46 show the failed components
and the force-displacement curve for one of the tests.
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Test Orientation Ultimate Force (kN) Failure Type
99100702 30/0 centered 17.1 Bolt fractured
99100703 30/0 centered 17.8 Bolt fractured
99100704 30/0 edge 18.0 Bolt fractured
99101101 30/15 centered 13.4 Bolt fractured
99101102 30/15 centered 16.3 Bolt fractured
99101103 30/15 centered 13.0 Bolt fractured
Table 8: Summary of test results for improved connection 2.
Figure 45: Result of test 99101102 shows the failed components.
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Conclusions from laboratory tests
An improved connection for the weak-post W-beam guardrail has been developed and
tested. The connection uses two 2.67 mm thick (12-gauge) square washers under the head
of a 6.35-mm (1/4-in) diameter A307A bolt. Two nuts tightened one turn past snug are
used on the post side with one circular washer under the nuts. Splice connections are
located between the posts. This connection consistently fails at a load of about 16 kN and
the failure occurs quickly so that the guardrail in an impact should be able to separate
easily from the post.
The connection was tested in a full-scale crash test implemented in a complete weak-post
W-beam system.
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Figure 46: Force-displacement graph for test 99101102.
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4.4 Full-scale crash test (TTI 473750-1)
A full-scale crash test was performed on the 23rd of November 1999 at the Texas
Transportation Institute with the improved connection implemented in a complete
guardrail installation. The test installation was a standard G2-system modified with the
new connection detail (e.g., one 6-mm diameter ASTM F568 Class 4.6 bolt with two
square washers under the bolt head (figure 47) tightened with two nuts and a circular
washer (figure 48)). Beginning in 1995 SI units were supposed to be used in all highway
design. The bolts used in the full-scale crash test were, therefore, SI unit specifications
rather than the U.S. Customary Units (USCU) specifications used in older specifications.
The material properties of the USCU A307A bolt correspond to the properties of the
metric ASTM F568 Class 4.6 bolt. The metric bolt that matches the 6.35-mm (1/4-in)
diameter A307A bolt best in size is the 6-mm diameter bolt. The splice was positioned
mid-span between posts (figure 49). The test was performed at NCHRP Report 350 test
designation 3-11 (i.e., a 2000-kg pickup truck impacting the guardrail system at the
impact speed of 100 km/h and with 25 degrees impact angle).
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Figure 47: Post-rail connection detail
showing one 6-mm diameter bolt
and two square washers.(9)
Figure 49: Guardrail installation of a
modified G2-system with splice
connection between posts.
As shown in figure 50 to 52, the rail
unexpectedly tore and the vehicle
penetrated the barrier. The failed guardrail
end can be seen in figure 53.
A more positive result from this test was that the post-rail connection work properly.
Figure 54 shows that the rail was released upstream from impact point, which indicates
that the connection fails easily. Figure 55 shows that the bolt failed without stripping nuts
or pulling the washers through the slots.
Figure 48: Post-rail connection detail
showing two nuts and a circular
washer.
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Figure 50: Crash sequence just before rail rupture (TTI 473750-1).
Figure 51: Crash sequence at rail rupture (TTI 473750-1).
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Figure 53: Torn guardrail.
Figure 52: Crash sequence after rail rupture (TTI 473750-1).
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Figure 54: Damage looking up-stream from the impact point.
Figure 55: Post-test view of connection components.(9)
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It was difficult to observe the actual guardrail fracture in the full-scale crash test. The
fractured guardrail segment shown in figure 53 was positioned at post 8. It appears, from
viewing high-speed videotapes of the crash test, that the tear initiated when the rail was
pulled over the top of post 8 creating a nick at the lower edge of the rail. This nick is
shown in figure 50. The rail ruptured completely when the nick came to the tension side
of the vehicle as shown in figures 51 and 52. The maximum tensile rail force upstream
from impact point, as obtained from strain gauges, was 275 kN, and the maximum tensile
strain downstream of the impact point was 151 kN.(9) The combination of a small cut
and significant tension in the guardrail caused the crack to propagate through the cross-
section of the rail and resulted in complete rupture of the rail. The rail was also fractured
at other posts. Figures 56 and 57 show that tearing was initiated at the lower edge of the
W-beam at other posts as well. These damages were similar to the nick that finally
ruptured the rail. However, the tension in the rail at these other locations was never high
enough to propagate the tear through the cross-section of the W-beam and rupture the
guardrail completely. The conclusion is that the nicking and tearing of the rail is not a
random phenomena but happens at every post as the rail is released from the post and
pulled over it.
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Figure 56: Guardrail tear initiated at a post.(9)
Figure 57: Rail deformation at a post.(9)
75
4.5 Summary
An improved post-rail connection for the weak-post W-beam guardrail was developed
and tested in the materials laboratory. The connection used two 2.67 mm thick square
washers under the head of a 6.35-mm diameter A307A bolt. Two nuts tightened one turn
past snug were used on the post side with one circular washer under the nuts. The splice
connections were positioned mid-span between the posts.
A full-scale crash test of a complete G2-guardrail system modified with the new post-rail
connection was performed at NCHRP Report 350 test level 3 conditions. In the full-scale
crash test a 6-mm diameter ASTM F568 Class 4.6 was used instead of the 6.35-mm
diameter A307A bolt. The material properties of these two bolts correspond but their
properties are specified in different units. The A307A bolt is specified in U.S. Customary
Units and the ASTM bolt is specified in SI units. The new connection performed well.
The guardrail installation in TTI test TTI 473750-1 failed to meet the Report 350
Structural Adequacy criterion since the W-beam tore and the vehicle penetrated the
barrier.
The following chapter of this report describes further investigations that were
performed, using finite element modeling, to determine the cause of the guardrail rupture
and to determine possible modifications to the system that would prevent it from
happening in the future. It also describes a full-scale crash test performed with the new
modifications implemented in a G2-system.
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5 GUARDRAIL RUPTURE
5.1 Introduction
When developing structures like guardrail systems, it is very time consuming and
expensive to perform full-scale physical tests to evaluate the impact performance. It is,
therefore, important to use laboratory testing and computer simulations to evaluate the
effects of any changes made to the system before full-scale crash tests are performed. It is
also difficult to collect enough data to tell what happened if an unexpected failure occurs
in a real test. Computer simulations give the opportunity to redo a crash test, collecting
all data needed, and investigate the failed component in detail.
The guardrail rupture in the preceding crash test was unexpected and the data that was
collected did not provide enough information to explore the failure completely. Full-scale
and sub-model simulations, using LS-DYNA, were used to study the impact in more
detail concentrating on the post-rail connection.
LS-DYNA, a nonlinear explicit three dimensional finite element code for analyzing the
large deformation dynamic response of inelastic solids and structures, was used for the
finite element analysis.(8) The pre-processor TrueGrid was used to generate the geometry
and mesh of the involved objects and to include springs, dampers, loads etc.(20) The
output file from TrueGrid is processed using the program LS-INGRID in order to
produce a LS-DYNA input file. After the input file has been equipped with contact
interface cards, time-history cards, etc. the analyses are performed using LS-DYNA. The
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results were examined using two different post processors: PostGL and eta PostGL.
PostGL was used to view overall deformations of the system and to generate contour
plots of various stress and strain components. Eta PostGL was used to process specific
time-history information such as internal energy, cross-section forces and nodal
displacements.
This section describes finite element simulations performed to explore the interaction
between post and rail. The objective of these simulations was to determine why the
guardrail ruptured and what could be done to prevent it from happening in the future.
Some modifications of the installation setup were developed and tested in a simulation.
Finally, a new full-scale crash test was performed with the new modifications included in
a weak-post W-beam guardrail installation.
5.2 Full-scale finite element model
The full-scale crash test (TTI 473750-1) failed to meet NCHRP Report 350 requirements
since the guardrail ruptured and the vehicle penetrated the barrier. High-speed videotapes
of the crash event showed that a tear was initiated at post 8 when the guardrail was pulled
over the top of the post. The tear could be seen as a nick in the lower edge of guardrail.
The guardrail ruptured completely when the nick came to the tension side of the vehicle.
Post-test investigations of damaged guardrail segments showed fractures on the lower
edge of the rail at other posts as well, similar to the nick that caused the rail to rupture.
This scenario was explored using a full-scale finite element model of the installation.
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The guardrail model (i.e., the W-beam with splice connections and the turn-down
terminal) was developed based on the models of standard guardrail components
developed by Ray and Patzner.(13) The post-soil interaction was modeled using non-
linear springs attached directly to the face of each post below the ground surface as
described by Plaxico, et al.(4) Figure 58 shows the installation with the splice
connections positioned in the mid-span between the posts. The post-rail connections were
modeled using the nodal rigid body spot weld option in LS-DYNA and the splice
connections were modeled with non-linear springs. The post-rail connections were set to
fail at a load of 17.8 kN. This failure load correspond to the failure load of the new
connection detail (e.g., one 6-mm diameter ASTM F568 Class 4.6 bolt with two square
washers under the bolt head tightened with two nuts and a circular washer). A turn-down
terminal was modeled at the downstream end of the installation. The farthest upstream
guardrail section was not modeled in order to reduce processing time. Instead, linear
springs were attached to the upstream end of the guardrail to simulate a continuation of
the guardrail. The stiffness of these end-springs corresponded to the stiffness of the
upstream section of the installation that was not modeled.
The components in the model have been used with good results in finite element models
of guardrail installations for several years.(13) (4) The overall performance of the
simulation corresponded well to the real crash test up to the point where the guardrail
ruptured. The simulation was therefore judged to perform well enough to be used for this
research. Guardrail tearing could not be simulated in the full-scale model. Simulating
79
fracture using finite element analysis would require a mesh with very small elements,
which would be very computationally demanding and impractical. The full-scale model
that was used in the investigation, however, was able to locate the high stress regions on
the guardrail that could lead to fracture.
The post of interest in this simulation was number 8 (figures 58 and 59) since the rail
rupture occurred at this post. Figure 60 shows a nick at the lower edge of the rail that
occurred after the rail had lost contact with post 8. This nick was created as the rail was
dragged up and over the top of the post and was similar to the nick observed in the real
test. As previously mentioned, the mesh was not fine enough to model the tearing of the
rail but it was fine enough to show the overall performance of the rail and to capture the
formation of the nick. The posts were bent and twisted as they were being pushed back
and the sharp edge of the post caused high stresses on the rail as shown in figure 61.
80
Figure 58: Simulated crash test with the interesting post marked.
Figure 59: Full-scale finite element model of a standard G2-system modified with the new
connection detail.
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Figure 61: Close-up view of the study post showing Von Mises stresses.
Figure 60: Close-up view of study post showing a nick at the lower
edge of the rail.
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Summary
The simulation and the high-speed videos of the full-scale crash test showed a nick at the
lower edge of the rail. This nick occurred after the rail had been pulled over the top of
post 8. The full-scale simulation revealed that the nick was created as the rail was
dragged up against the post over the sharp flange of the top of the twisted post. When this
nick came to the tension side of the vehicle, in the physical test, the rail tore apart and the
vehicle penetrated the barrier. Basically, the simulation confirmed the theory formulated
from viewing high-speed videos. The guardrail mesh in this full-scale finite element
model was not fine enough to capture stress-concentrations in the post-rail interaction
completely. It was, though, fine enough to give valuable data about the overall outcome
of the test like displacements, velocities and accelerations and to capture the nick. The
post-rail interaction needs to be further investigated in order to determine exactly why the
tear occurs at the post. A sub-model of the guardrail section at post 8 was developed to
examine the stress-concentrations in this region during impact.
5.3 Sub-model
A full-scale simulation of a crash-test is good for simulating the overall outcome of a test
but may not give enough information about stress concentrations in the particular
components. In this case, the post-rail interaction during the crash needed to be examined
more closely where the crack was initiated and the rail tore. A section of the full-scale
model, covering the study post, was therefore cut out to constitute a so-called sub-model
(figure 62). A sub-model is a model that only involves specific components of a
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Figure 62: Sub-model of the study post.
particular system. The benefit of such a model compared to the full-scale model is that
particular components of interest can be modeled with a much finer mesh so that high
stress concentration regions can be studied in detail in a reasonable amount of
computation time.
The sub-model consisted of two parts, the guardrail and the study post. Nodal time
history data was selected from the cross-section of the rail in the simulated full-scale
crash test, 952 mm upstream and downstream of the study post. These data contained the
positions for all selected nodes and for every time-step throughout the crash. By
normalizing each node position with the original position of the node, the time-
displacement curve for each node was determined. These time-displacement histories
were applied as loads at the guardrail ends
in the sub-model. This way, the same full-
scale simulation could be performed just
looking at the post where the rail tore. No
bolted connection was modeled between the
post and the rail since the movement of the
rail in the sub-model was pre-determined
from the full-scale simulation and, also, the
connection had already released the rail
when the nick formed. The post-ground
connection was the same as in the full-scale model.
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In order to examine stress-concentrations, the rail and post in the sub-model was modeled
with a fine mesh where they interact (where the rail is connected to the post) as can be
seen in figure 63.
Figure 63: Sub-model mesh of the study post and rail.
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Wright and Ray developed LS-DYNA material models for guardrail steel.(5) The
material properties for these models were collected from laboratory experiments and
literature sources. Basic material data like density, modulus of elasticity, and Poisson’s
ratio were obtained from material references and more complicated data like yield stress
and the effective-stress verses effective plastic strain curve were determined from
experiments.
Two different LS-DYNA material models were used for modeling guardrail steel, the
kinematic/isotropic elastic-plastic material model (Type 3) and the rate-dependent tabular
isotropic elastic-plastic material model (Type 24).(5) There were two different sets of
properties for material model Type 3, one bi-linear set covering elongations up to 11
percent and one elastic-perfectly plastic set covering elongations from 11 percent up to
failure, which happens at about 25 percent elongation. Both sets of properties are
accurate as long as they are used in the appropriate range of elongations. The authors
came to the conclusion that  “material Types 3 and 24 are not adequate for modeling
strain rate effects for AASHTO M-180 guardrail” and they did therefore not include
strain-rate effects in the models.(5)
All these material models are good choices for modeling guardrail steel as long as they
are used at appropriate levels of strains. Type 24 has the advantage of being accurate for
all elongations. Type 3 is a simpler model than Type 24. Numerical and contact problems
can sometimes be avoided using Type 3 instead of Type 24. The W-beam guardrail in the
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sub-model experiences elongations over the entire elongation response. It was important,
in this research, to have an accurate material model for the guardrail and Type 24 was the
obvious choice. The perfectly-plastic material Type 3 model was chosen for the post
since it will experience high elongations. Another reason was to avoid numerical
problems.
The failure mechanism in LS-DYNA material Type 24 uses the effective plastic strain as
failure criteria. When the effective plastic strain reaches a pre-specified value the element
stress is put to zero, essentially removing the element from the model. This failure
mechanism is very mesh sensitive and a specific value of the maximum effective plastic
strain has to be set for each mesh. This value was not known for the sub-model and was
therefore not implemented in the model.
Belytschko-Tsay 3D-shell elements with three integration points through the thickness
were used for all materials in the model. Material and element data are summarized in
Table 9.
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Material Type 3 Material Type 24
Density (Mg/mm3) 7.86e-9 7.86e-9
Young’s Modulus (MPa) 200.e+3 200e+3
Poisson’s Ratio 0.33 0.33
Yield Stress (MPa) 528.0 415.0
Tangent Modulus 300.0 -
Hardening parameter Isotropic Isotropic
Strain rate effects None None
Failure condition No No
Increments of strain - 0. 0.02 0.08, 0.165 0.33 0.495 0.66 1.0
Increments of stress (MPa) - 415 415 548 585 591 595 600 605.
Element type Belytschko-
Tsay
Belytschko-Tsay
No. of Integration points 3 3
Table 9: Material and element data for AASHTO M-180 Class A Type II guardrail steel.(5)
The contact definitions in the LS-DYNA input file defines if and how different materials
can interact with each other. Only one definition was necessary for the sub-model since
the only contact was between the post flange and the rail. Automatic single surface (Type
13) was used for the contact. (8) The static coefficient of friction was set to 0.15, the
88
dynamic coefficient of friction to 0.09 and the exponential decay coefficient was set to
0.266e-3.(14)
The post was twisted as it was pushed back in the soil as is typical in weak-post guardrail
collisions. The sharp edge of the post flange caused high stresses at the lower edge of the
W-beam as the rail was dragged up against the post flange (figure 64). In order to
investigate the affect of this stress-concentration on the potential for tearing the guardrail,
a shell element in the high stress region at the lower edge of the rail was selected, as
shown in figure 65. The Von Mises stress time history for the particular element (shell
element 5449) is shown in figure 66. The first part of the post-rail interaction time the rail
was pushed against the post flange and followed the post as it was bent back and twisted.
The rail did not move much relative to the post flange during this period of time. Then,
the rail started to move up the post at approximately 0.12 seconds and reached the top of
the post just before 0.16 seconds. The curve shows that the intensity of the stress
increases continuously during this period when the rail is dragged up the post flange and
the rail is moving relative to the post flange. The post-rail contact ceased when the lower
edge of the W-beam was pulled over the top of the post and correspondingly the element
stress decreased rapidly after that time. The stress in the element reached a magnitude of
588 MPa just before the rail lost contact with the top of the post. This was the highest
stress observed in the rail throughout the time of post-rail interaction. The stress
increased from about 300 MPa to nearly 600 MPa during the period where the rail was
moving up the post. After the rail had been pulled over the post, a kink in the high stress
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region was evident as can be seen in figure 65. This deformation was similar to the nick
that was observed in the physical test. The only difference between the simulation of the
test was that the kink progressed into a tear in the physical test.
Figure 64: Mises stress contour plot.
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Figure 66: Von Mises stress verses time graph for shell element No. 5449.
Figure 65: Location of shell element No. 5449 shown in a Von Mises stress contour plot.
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The most probable location for a tear to be initiated was at the lower edge of the rail
where the kink was formed in the simulation and where the nick was observed in the
physical test. The highest stresses in the rail were found in this region of the W-beam and
the beam experienced large plastic deformations in this region. These stresses were well
above the yield point of 415 MPa so tearing is likely if the strains are large enough. Since
no failure criterion was implemented in the guardrail material model, tearing was not
observed in the simulated event.
The contour plot shown in figure 64 also show high stresses in the middle of the guardrail
cross-section at the post. The maximum Von Mises stress in the middle guardrail cross-
section was 515 MPa, which is beyond the yield point. Based on the stress contours a tear
could be initiated here as well although not as likely as at the lower edge of the W-beam.
The effective plastic strain is a more direct measure of the potential for fracture than the
stress since it is a measure of the cumulative permanent damage to the material. The
effective plastic strain in the guardrail was examined to identify the location of a possible
tear.
Figure 67 shows a concentration of effective plastic strain in the region at the lower edge
of the rail where the kink was formed. The maximum effective plastic strain in the
simulation was 0.37, which was observed in shell element 5453 (figure 68).
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Figure 67: Effective plastic strain contour plot.
Figure 68: Location of shell element 5453 shown in an ef. plastic strain contour plot.
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Figure 69 shows the effective plastic
strain time history for element 5453.
The effective plastic strain remains
low during the time where the rail
follows the post not moving relative
to it. Then, the effective plastic
strain increases rapidly as the rail is
dragged up against the sharp edge of
the post flange creating the kink.
The full-scale and the sub-model simulation showed that the kink that was observed in
the full-scale physical test at the lower edge of the rail was formed as the rail was
dragged up against the sharp edge of the twisted post. Examinations of sub-model Von
Mises contour plots showed that the highest Von Mises stresses in the rail were located
where the nick was formed and contour plots of the effective plastic strain showed a clear
concentration of plastic deformations in this region. The combination of high stresses and
significant plastic deformation could initiate a tear, which then could propagate through
the W-beam cross-section when the tension in the rail increases.
A failure criterion was now implemented in the model. A tear should, according to the
theory previously discussed, be initiated at the lower edge of the rail where the nick was
formed. Again, the effective plastic strain is very sensitive to the fineness of the mesh and
Figure 69: Effective plastic strain verses time
graph for shell element No. 5453.
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values collected from a simulation do not necessarily agree with values measured in
physical tests. However, the failure strain for guardrail material was measured by Wright
and Ray to about 25 percent and the highest effective plastic strain in the simulation was
0.37 so the mesh seems to be fine enough to capture the strains pretty good.(5) The
effective plastic strain at failure was set to 0.15 and a new analysis was performed. The
contour plot of the effective plastic strain of this simulation is shown in figure 70. A tear
was initiated at the lower edge of the rail and propagated approximately 70-mm as the
rail was moving up the post.
Figure 70: Effective plastic strain contour plot showing a tear initiated at the lower edge of the rail.
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5.4 Conclusions from simulations
The nick that was observed in the physical full-scale crash test (TTI 473750-1) has been
investigated using a full-scale finite element model and a sub-model. The results from
these simulations show that the nick/tear was initiated as the post was dragged up the
sharp edge of the twisted post. The problem is the sharp edge of the post and the rail
moving relative to it.
There are two alternatives for solving this problem. Develop a new post without sharp
edges (i.e., rounded geometry) or prevent the rail from coming in contact with the sharp
edges of the posts. The most straightforward and least expensive solution is to use a
standard W-beam backup plate behind the rail, as is used in the G4 W-beam strong-post
system with steel block-outs. The backup plate prevents the sharp edge of the post from
contacting and cutting the rail. The splice connections in a standard G2 system are
located at every post and the double thickness of guardrail steel prevents the rail from
tearing against the post the same way the backup plates do in a W-beam strong-post
system. In this new setup with splices between the posts there is only one layer of rail at
every post and it seems to be reasonable to use backup plates.
A back-up plate was added to the model and a new simulation was performed in order to
test the ability of the backup-plate to prevent guardrail tearing.
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5.5 Sub-model with backup plate
This model is the same as the former except a backup plate between the post and the rail
was added (figure 71). The plate is made of the same W-beam guardrail material as the
main guardrail.
A finite element analysis was performed with this sub-model in order to find out how a
backup plate might reduce the maximum Von Mises stress and the maximum effective
plastic strain in the guardrail and thereby prevent rupture. Figure 72 shows the Von Mises
contour plot for the guardrail. As observed in the simulation without backup plate, there
was a stress-concentration at the lower edge of the rail where a dent was visible. A shell
element was selected in this region (element 6015) and the Von Mises stress time history
was plotted (figure 73). The element stress increases continuously during the time up to
Figure 71: Sub-model with backup plate.
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approximately 0.12 seconds where the backup plate and rail follows the post as it is bent
and twisted. The Von Mises stress reached 512 MPa just as the backup plate and rail
starts to slide up against the sharp edge of the post flange. This was the highest stress
observed in the rail. The stress does not change much during the period from 0.12
seconds to 0.16 seconds when the rail is moving up the flange and pulled over the top of
the post.
Figure 72: Von Mises stress contour plot.
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A stress concentration was observed in the same region for both the simulation with and
the simulation without backup plate, which is the region where the nick was observed in
the physical full-scale crash test at the lower edge of the rail. However, the maximum
Von Mises stress observed in the guardrail was 13 percent less with the backup plate
behind the rail than without. The major difference was, though, that the stress in the
guardrail did not increase during the period where the guardrail with backup plate was
moving up the post as it did in the simulation without backup plate. The question was
now if 13 percent less stress would prevent the guardrail from tearing. To answer this
question a study of the effective plastic strain was performed.
Figure 73: Von Mises stress verses time graph for shell element No. 6015.
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The contour plot of the effective plastic strain in figure 74 shows a concentration where
the dent was formed. An element was selected in this region (element 6022) and the
effective plastic strain time history was plotted (figure 75). As observed in the simulation
without the backup plate behind the rail the material at the lower edge of the W-beam
formed a kink/dent as the rail moved up the post. This can be observed following the Von
Mises time history curve from 0.12 to 0.16 seconds. The effective plastic strain reached
0.23 as the rail was pulled over the top of the flange. This was the maximum effective
plastic strain in the model. Adding the backup plate to the model reduced the effective
plastic strain by 38 percent.
Figure 74: Effective plastic strain contour plot.
100
There was a stress-concentration at the lower edge of the backup plate as well (figure 76).
The maximum element Von Mises stress in this region was 554 MPa and the maximum
effective plastic strain was 0.28.
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Figure 75: Effective plastic strain verses time graph for shell element No. 6022.
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Guardrail
( without backup)
Guardrail
(with backup)
Reduction
(%)
Backup plate
Maximum Von
Mises stress (MPa)
588 512 13 554
Maximum effective
plastic strain
0.37 0.23 38 0.28
Table 10: Summary
5.6 Conclusions
Table 10 summarizes all data from the simulations performed with and without the
backup plate behind the rail. The Von Mises stress reduction was 13 percent in the
Figure 76: Von Mises stress contour plot of the study post.
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guardrail and the reduction in the effective plastic strain was 38 percent when adding the
backup plate to the model. The backup plate prevented the guardrail from coming in
contact with the sharp edge of the post and with the backup plate added to the model the
guardrail did not move relative to any other material. The backup plate was judged to be
a success based on these two facts and the 38 percent decrease in effective plastic strain.
The backup plate should prevent the guardrail from rupturing. The higher stress and
effective plastic strain in the backup plate is no problem since it is a sacrificed
component.
5.7 Full-scale crash test (TTI 473750-2)
The full-scale crash-test (TTI 473750-1)
was repeated the 6th of January 2000 except
with backup plates behind the rail. The
backup plates were mounted on 6-mm
diameter post-rail ASTM F568 Class 4.6
bolts with increased length (figures 77 and
78). Another modification for this test was
to eliminate the 14-mm diameter shelf bolt
underneath the rail in order to eliminate the
risk of initiating a tear through contact this
bolt (figure 79).
Figure 77: Backup plate behind rail. (17)
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Figure 79: Eliminated shelf bolt.
Figure 78: Guardrail and backup plate mounted on a 6-
mm diameter bolt with increased length.
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The vehicle was redirected as it should in the beginning (figure 80, 81, 82) but toward the
end of the impact event the rail dropped allowing the vehicle to override the barrier
(figure 83,84,85). The guardrail did not tear and the post-rail connection failed like it
should. Both modifications were successful although the test was a failure. Figure 86
shows a damaged backup plate. This damage could have grown and tore the rail without
the plate as protection.
Figure 80: Crash sequence at time » 0.2 sec (TTI 473750-2).
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Figure 81: Crash sequence at time » 0.3 sec (TTI 473750-2).
Figure 82: Crash sequence at time » 0.4 sec (TTI 473750-2).
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Figure 83: Crash sequence at time » 0.6 sec (TTI 473750-2).
Figure 84: Crash sequence at time » 0.7 sec (TTI 473750-2).
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Figure 85: Crash sequence at time » 0.9 sec (TTI 473750-2).
Figure 86: Typical backup plate damage.(17)
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By viewing high-speed videos of the crash it is clear that the rail dropped slightly during
impact. This loss of height was enough for the front right wheel of the vehicle to come in
contact with the guardrail. The wheel pulled the guardrail down and the vehicle climbed
over the guardrail and ended up on the wrong side of the barrier.
The guardrail installation in TTI test 473750-2 failed to meet the report 350 Structural
Adequacy criterion since the vehicle overrode the installation.
The following chapter describes research performed, using finite element analysis, to
determine the cause of the vehicle overriding the barrier and to determine possible
modifications that would prevent it from happening in the future. It also describes a full-
scale crash test with the modifications implemented in a G2-installation.
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6 GUARDRAIL MOUNTING HEIGHT
The mounting height of the guardrail, 610 mm from the ground to the center slot of the
guardrail, is well suited for passenger cars but may not be for pickup trucks. The full-
scale crash test (TTI 473750-2) performed well until the front right wheel came in contact
with the guardrail late in the event. When this happened, the wheel pulled the rail to the
ground allowing the vehicle to climb over the rail. The rail did not need to drop much for
this to happen. One solution to this problem would be to mount the guardrail higher. If it
is too high, though, passenger cars may underride the guardrail and if it is too low the
pickup truck will override the rail. The best compromise height suitable for the pickup
truck and small car had to be identified.
6.1 Full-scale finite element simulations
The top of the rail in the standard G2-system is located 770 mm above ground. Full-scale
finite element simulations were performed at NCHRP Report 350 test designation 3-10
and 3-11 conditions with the height of the guardrail increased 50 mm to 820 mm above
ground to test the performance of the installation in impacts with both small cars and
pickup trucks.
Figures 87 through 90 show the results of a simulated test at NCHRP Report 350 test
designation 3-10 conditions. The vehicle, an 820-kg Honda Civic, was contained and
redirected as required. The major concern for this simulation was to make sure that the
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passenger car did not underride the guardrail at the higher mounting height. As shown in
the figures, the first rail-vehicle contact happened at the fender of the vehicle and the rail
remained in contact with the fender through out the impact. The increased mounting
height of the guardrail was considered not to have affected the performance of the G2-
system at test designation 3-10 conditions.
The results of the simulation at NCHRP Report 350 3-11 conditions are shown in figures
91 through 93. The first rail-vehicle contact happened at the bumper of the vehicle and
the rail was in contact with the fender through out the impact. The vehicle did not
override the barrier and the increased rail height was considered a good solution based on
the simulation.
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Figure 89: Crash sequence at time » 0.25 sec
(test designation 3-10).
Figure 87: Crash sequence at time » 0.06 sec
(test designation 3-10).
Figure 88: Crash sequence at time » 0.16
sec (test designation 3-10).
Figure 90: Crash sequence at time » 0.58 sec
(test designation 3-10).
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Figure 91: Crash sequence at time » 0.07 sec (test designation 3-11).
Figure 92: Crash sequence at time » 0.55
sec (test designation 3-11).
The finite element simulations indicated that the modified G2-system with a rail height of
820 mm should satisfy the Report 350 test 3-10 and 3-11 test requirements. A full-scale
crash test was, therefore, scheduled to verify the finite element simulation results.
Figure 93: Crash sequence at time » 0.95 sec
(test designation 3-11).
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6.2 Full-cale crash test (TTI 473750-3)
All three full-scale crash tests that were conducted for this project were performed at
NCHRP Report 350 test designation 3-11 conditions (i.e., a 2000-kg pickup truck
impacting the guardrail system at the impact speed of 100 km/h and with a 25 degrees
impact angle). The objective of the project was to develop a weak-post W-beam system
that satisfies the requirements of this test.
A review of the videotapes of the previously performed full-scale crash test (TTI 473750-
2) raised the question that the post-rail connection possibly failed too easy.  Therefore, an
8-mm diameter ASTM F568 Class 4.6 bolt with increased length was used instead of the
6-mm diameter bolt that was used before. The purpose of the bigger bolt was to increase
the failure load without changing the failure mechanism. The desirable failure mechanism
for the connection should still be to fracture the bolt without stripping threads or pulling
washers through the central slot. The two square washers under the bolt head were
therefore kept and likewise the bolt was still tightened with two nuts behind a circular
washer. Figures 95 and 96 shows the post-rail connection detail. Also, the 14-mm
diameter shelf bolt underneath the rail was put in place again to gain some extra support
for the rail (figure 97).
The full-scale crash test was performed on the 9th of May 2000 with some modifications.
The purpose of these modifications was to prevent the guardrail from dropping and the
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vehicle from overriding the barrier. The major modification of the system was to raise the
rail 50 mm so that the top of the rail now was located 820 mm above ground (figure 94).
Table 11 shows a comparison between the standard weak post W-beam guardrail
installation and the modified G2-system that was tested in this full-scale crash test (TTI
473750-3).
Feature Standard G2-system Modified G2-system (TTI 473750-3)
Rail height (mm) 770 820
Splice At every post. Between posts (figure 62)
Bolt 8-mm diameter
ASTM F568 Class 4.6
8-mm diameter
ASTM F568 Class 4.6
Washer 1 2
Nut 1 2
Backup plate None Yes
Table 11: Comparison between the standard G2-system and the modified G2-system tested in the
full-scale crash test (TTI 473750-3).
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When this report was written the TTI test report had not yet been completed. While
evaluations were performed to determine if the test was a success, all the data was not yet
available. The high-speed videotapes were, though, available and the following was
observed from viewing these.
Figure 94: Splice connections located
between posts. Backup plates
behind the rail at posts.
Figure 95: Post-rail connection detail
showing one 8-mm diameter bolt
and two square washers.
Figure 96: Guardrail and backup plate
mounted on an 8-mm diameter
bolt with increased length
tightened with two nuts behind a
circular washer.
Figure 97: Shelf bolt.
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The vehicle was contained and redirected and the vehicle did not penetrate, underride or
override the installation as can be seen in figures 98 to 103. This means that the barrier
should pass the NCHRP Report 350 Structural Adequacy criterion.(12) The vehicle was
redirected parallel to the guardrail and did not intrude into adjacent traffic. The test
should, therefore, fulfill at least two of three of the factors in the NCHRP Report 350
Vehicle Trajectory criterion. The third factor includes occupant velocities and
accelerations and these data were obtained directly from TTI. The longitudinal occupant
impact velocity was 3.9 m/s, which is well below the upper limit of 12 m/s. The occupant
ridedown acceleration in the longitudinal direction was –5.9 g’s, which is well below the
upper limit of 20 g’s. The test should, therefore, pass the Vehicle Trajectory criterion.
The vehicle remained upright during and after collision and should fulfill the first of two
factors in the NCHRP Report 350 Occupant Risk criterion. The second factor says that no
elements of the installation should present a hazard to other traffic, pedestrians or
personnel in a work zone. The post-test videotapes showed that two posts had been pulled
out of the ground and thrown out on the lane (figure 104). These posts appear to have
been dragged into the road by the vehicle and did not pose a threat to other vehicles on
the roadway.
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Figure 98: Crash sequence at time » 0.18 sec (TTI 473750-3).
Figure 99: Crash sequence at time » 0.30 sec (TTI 473750-3).
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Figure 100: Crash sequence at time » 0.50 sec (TTI 473750-3).
Figure 101: Crash sequence at time » 0.77 sec (TTI 473750-3).
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Figure 102: Crash sequence at time » 1.20 sec (TTI 473750-3).
Figure 103: Crash sequence at time » 2.73 sec (TTI 473750-3).
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The weak-posts are supposed to bend back and release the guardrail and not to break or
be pulled out of the ground. Figure 105 shows a post that was not bent and the post-rail
connection was still intact. The post rotated in the ground and allowed the rail to deflect
without bending the post or fail the post-rail connection. Reviewing the videotapes of the
test raised questions about the firmness of the soil. The soil appeared to be saturated after
several days of rain at the test site. A good firm soil should support and hold the post
enough to keep the post base in position allowing the post to bend and the post-rail
connection to fail. It appeared that the poor condition of the soil made the post-ground
connection weak allowing the posts to rotate in the ground and be pulled out. Also, the
post embedment was 50 mm less than typical in this test due to the increased rail height,
which further weakened the post-soil connection. The latter could easily be avoided by
mounting the soil-plates 50 mm lower on the posts so that it remains at the proper
location (124 mm below ground).
Despite the assumed poor soil conditions and/or post embedment that resulted in the
posts being pulled out of the ground, the overall outcome of the test was a success. The
fact that the soil condition was poor and the post embedment was less than standard
should have increased the likelihood of pulling the rail to the ground, however, the
system performed well even under these adverse circumstances. This indicates that the
increased mounting height was an appropriate design change.
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Figure 104: Posts pulled out from the ground.
Figure 105: Post-test close-up on post.
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7 RESULTS
The major goal of this project was to improve the impact performance of the weak-post
W-beam guardrail system so that it satisfies the requirements of NCHRP Report 350 at
test level three. Since the G2-system already had passed test designation 3-10 (i.e., the
small car test) the objective was to pass test designation 3-11.
Specific issues related to the performance of the weak-post W-beam system were:
· Prevent guardrail ruptures at the splice connection,
· Developing a more reliable post-rail connection detail,
· Reducing the chance of rupturing the guardrail and
· Preventing the vehicle from vaulting over the guardrail.
The modified weak-post installation that was developed in this project was crash tested
under NCHRP Report 350 test designation 3-11 conditions by Texas Transportation
Institute in test TTI 473750-3. The new system contained and redirected the vehicle, a
2000-kg pickup truck, without rupturing or vaulting over the guardrail. All the specific
issues mentioned above are fulfilled by the modified weak-post guardrail system. It was
not known at this time whether the installation passed or failed the final full-scale crash
test at NCHRP Report 350 test designation 3-11, but the improvement in the performance
of the system was apparent. The final modifications of the weak-post W-beam system are
listed in table 11.
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A finite element model of the splice connection was developed within the scope of this
report, which was a secondary goal of this research.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
First, a new post-rail connection was developed and tested both in the materials
laboratory and in a full-scale crash test (TTI 473750-1) implemented in a complete weak-
post W-beam guardrail installation. The connection consisted of one 6-mm diameter
ASTM F568 Class 4.6 bolt with two square washers under the bolt head tightened with
two nuts and a circular washer. The splice connections were positioned mid-span
between posts. The connection itself worked satisfactory but the guardrail ruptured in the
full-scale crash test. A tear was initiated at the lower edge of the rail as it was dragged up
against the sharp post-flange edge of a twisted post in the crash test. This tear grew as the
tension increased in the rail and finally tore the rail completely. Using F.E. modeling it
was determined that a possible solution to this problem was to use backup plates between
the W-beam and the posts.
A second full-scale crash test (TTI 473750-2) was performed with backup plates added
behind the rail. The 14-mm diameter shelf bolt underneath the rail was removed to
eliminate the risk of initiating a tear through contact with this bolt. The backup plates
prevented the guardrail from tearing but the test failed again since the car overrode the
rail due to decreased rail height. Since the rail did not tear and since the post-rail
connection failed easily and quickly as it should a more fundamental problem had to be
solved in order to achieve a G2-system that fulfills NCHRP Report 350 test designation
3-11 conditions. The vehicle overrode the guardrail when the W-beam dropped allowing
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the front left wheel to come in contact with guardrail and pull the rail to the ground.
Finite element simulations were performed with the guardrail mounted 50 mm higher
than the standard 610-mm from the ground to the center slot. Both passenger cars and
pickup trucks performed well in the simulated full-scale crash-test. The G2-system was
originally developed to sustain and redirect typical passenger cars, not pickup trucks.
Increasing the height of the rail might prevent the pick-up truck from overriding the rail
but one has to be careful so that a small car does not underride the rail either.
A third full-scale crash-test (TTI 473750-3) was performed with the guardrail mounted
50-mm higher than in the standard G2-system. A review of the videotapes of the full-
scale crash test (TTI 473750-2) raised the question that the post-rail connection may have
failed too easily. Therefore, an 8-mm diameter ASTM F568 Class 4.6 bolt was used
instead of the 6-mm diameter bolt that was used in the two previous tests. Also, the 14-
mm diameter shelf bolt underneath the rail was put in place again to gain some extra
support for the rail. The overall performance of the installation in the crash test was
satisfactory. The vehicle was contained and redirected according to the NCHRP Report
350 evaluation criteria, although some posts had been pulled out of the ground and
thrown back into the traffic lane possibly violating NCHRP Report 350. From viewing
high-speed videos of the impact it appeared that wet soil conditions were the likely cause
of the posts pulling out of the ground. The final test report from TTI was not completed
prior to the submission of this thesis so it was not known whether the installation passed
or failed the test although the test appeared to be a success.
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Future work with this installation includes a full-scale crash test at NCHRP Report 350
test designation 3-10 conditions that is scheduled in June 2000 to test the performance of
the modified weak-post W-beam system when impacted by a small car. If these tests, the
test at test designation 3-10 and the test at 3-11, are successful the system will meet
NCHRP Report 350 at test level three and will be acceptable to use on Federal-Aid
Highways in the United States.
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